ABSTRACT Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) can be used to design intelligent agents for solving cooperative tasks. Within the MARL category, this paper proposes the probability of maximal reward based on the infinitesimal gradient ascent (PMR-IGA) algorithm to reach the maximal total reward in repeated games. Theoretical analyses show that in a finite-player-finite-action repeated game with two pure optimal joint actions where no common component action exists, both the optimal joint actions are stable critical points of the PMR-IGA model. Furthermore, we apply the Q-value function to estimate the gradient and derive the probability of maximal reward based on estimated gradient ascent (PMR-EGA) algorithm. Theoretical analyses and simulations of case studies of repeated games show that the maximal total reward can be achieved under any initial conditions. The PMR-EGA can be naturally extended to optimize cooperative stochastic games. Two stochastic games, i.e., box pushing and a distributed sensor network, are used as test beds. The simulations show that the PMR-EGA displays consistently an excellent performance for both stochastic games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is a type of unsupervised learning that occurs under a multi-agent environment [1] , [2] and is performed to reach a type of equilibrium through a process in which each agent adjusts its behavior via reinforcement learning (RL) [3] - [5] . In a system in which multiple agents must cooperate to complete a task [6] - [8] , the team benefit becomes the primary concern. This paper investigates methods of achieving the maximal expected total reward in cooperative scenarios. Specifically, a gradient-ascent-based MARL algorithm is proposed to obtain the maximal expected team benefit in this paper.
In policy-gradient methods [9] - [11] , the policy of the agent is parameterized, and in each step, the parameters are updated in the gradient direction to optimize a given performance measure. Compared with critic reinforcement learning algorithms, which include Q-learning [12] and StateAction-Reward-State-Action (SARSA) [13] , policy-gradient methods can address continuous actions and have much better convergence properties. However, policy-gradient methods suffer from the slow learning problem because of the high variance of the estimated gradient. Policy-gradient actor-critic methods [14] combine the merits of both the policy-gradient methods and critic methods. The critic's low variance of estimated expected return makes the actor's variance of the estimated gradient much smaller, which leads to faster convergence. Although policy-gradient actor-critic methods related to MARL [15] , [16] are not as fruitful as single-agent RL, the methodology that applies a value function to obtain a good estimation of the gradient can be used to design new MARL algorithms.
Another inspiring methodology is the derivation of practical MARL algorithms from MARL models via a continuous Q-value updating process, which has been previously performed. Infinitesimal gradient ascent (IGA) [17] is a gradient-ascent-based MARL algorithm designed to achieve the maximal expected reward in a repeated game. To gain as much reward as possible, each agent updates its strategy in the gradient ascent direction. The win-or-learn-fast (WoLF) heuristic was incorporated with the IGA algorithm, which produced the WoLF-IGA algorithm [18] . When the current strategy gained a reward that was better than the expected one, it used a small learning rate to update its current strategy to maintain the good strategy; otherwise, it used a relatively large learning rate to update its current strategy to dispose of the bad strategy. Using policy hill-climbing (PHC) method to estimate the gradient, a practical MARL algorithm known as WoLF-PHC [18] was proposed with the goal of gaining the maximal total reward in repeated games and stochastic games.
Most theoretical results on the convergence of MARL algorithms are obtained under repeated games. Waltman and Kaymak [19] used Markov chains to study the convergence of independent Q-learning (IQL) under the prisoner's dilemma. However, the analysis procedure is sophisticated, and it cannot describe the dynamic characteristics of the learning process. Tuyls and Nowated, anTuyls and Parsons [21] , and Bloembergen et al. [22] first built the model of IQL with Boltzmann action selection. After transforming the Q-value update process into a continuous process, the model of IQL could be represented as a set of differential equations. Moreover, the IQL model was similar to the replicator dynamic equations in the evolutionary game domain. Kianercy and Galstyan [23] further analyzed the stability of the critical points of the IQL model presented by Tuyls and Nowy [20] in two-agent two-action repeated games. Babes et al. [24] built the IQL model with ε-greedy action selection and noted that more robust MARL algorithms could be obtained by modifying the action selection policy and algorithm parameters.
The derivation of WoLF-PHC from IGA is a good method for designing MARL algorithms. However, analyzing the convergence of IGA and WoLF-IGA is complicated for the following reasons. First, the performance measure, i.e., the expected reward, depends on all elements of the payoff matrix, which produces a highly complex expression of the gradient. Second, the IGA and WoLF-IGA models both have only one critical point, which is a saddle point. Thus, the stability at the boundary must be analyzed, which is a nontrivial task. To address these issues, we propose a gradient-ascent-based MARL algorithm known as the probability of maximal reward based on infinitesimal gradient ascent (PMR-IGA) algorithm. The proposed algorithm alleviates the above problems in two ways. First, the probability of obtaining the maximal total reward is selected as the objective function instead of the expected reward, which simplifies the expression of the gradient. Second, a factor is added to the gradient, which leads to the creation of extra critical points, and only the desired points are stable. We use the Q-value function of joint actions to estimate the gradient to derive a practical MARL algorithm known as the probability of maximal reward based on estimated gradient ascent (PMR-EGA).
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section II introduces stochastic games and repeated games. Section III proposes PMR-IGA and studies its dynamics in repeated games. Section IV proposes the practical algorithm PMR-EGA together with a gradient estimation method. Section V presents simulations of repeated games. Section VI extends PMR-EGA to optimize stochastic games. Section VII is devoted to comparing PRM-EGA with other MARL algorithms in two stochastic games, i.e., box pushing and a distributed sensor network (DSN). Section VIII summarizes the conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. STOCHASTIC GAMES
A stochastic game [2] can be represented by a tuple < S,
where M is the number of agents, S is the set of states, A i is the set of agent i's available actions, A i for all agents i (i = 1, 2, . . . , M ) constitutes the joint action set
is the conditional probability of arriving at state s if the joint action a ∈ A has been selected under state s, and r i :
the local immediate reward function of agent i, which determines how much reward agent i receives after the joint action a has been selected under state s. The total immediate reward function is the sum of the local immediate reward functions of all agents and is defined as r = M i=1 r i . In a cooperative stochastic game, the learning goal is to maximize the discounted total cumulative reward at each time t,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor (smaller γ values correspond to a greater importance of near future rewards), K is the ending time of an episode, and r(t + 1) is the global immediate reward received at time t + 1. In a stochastic game with finite steps, γ can be equal to 1. In this paper, when we use the term 'reward' in the context of a cooperative stochastic game, we refer to the total cumulative reward.
B. REPEATED GAMES
In a repeated game, the joint action completely determines how much reward each agent can receive. In a fully cooperative repeated game, we are concerned with only the team benefit. Thus, when we use the term 'reward' in the context of a cooperative repeated game, we refer to the total immediate reward. Fig. 1 shows the payoff matrix of a repeated game with two agents and two actions. Each row represents an action of agent 1, and each column represents an action of agent 2. Each element of the payoff matrix represents the total reward. In Fig. 1 , if agent 1 chooses the first action while agent 2 chooses the second action, then they receive a total reward of 2.
III. PMR-IGA: A GRADIENT-BASED MARL ALGORITHM FOR COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE AGENTS
The aim of PMR-IGA [25] is to learn a policy to maximize the probability of obtaining the maximal total reward in a repeated game. For PMR-IGA, each agent knows the gradient information, and the Q-value for action j of agent i changes as follows:
where P is the probability of obtaining the maximal total reward for each agent, and it is determined by the Q-values of all actions of all agents; and k =j Q i k is the sum of the Q-values of agent i's all actions except action j. If Q i j < 0, then Q i j is set to zero. The probability of agent i selecting action j is updated as follows:
If k Q i k = 0, then a random action is chosen according to the uniform distribution. The term Q i j k =j Q i k has two effects. First, by multiplying this term by the partial derivative term, we can use (2) and (3) to obtain a set of derivative equations describing the joint strategy that does not explicitly contain the Q-value, which facilitates the process of analyzing the dynamics of PMR-IGA. Second, the desired critical points corresponding to the optimal joint strategies are stable by adding this factor. PMR-IGA has the following property. , . . . , a n m n ) are stable critical points of the PMR-IGA model described by (2) .
Proof: The probability of obtaining the maximal total reward is given as follows:
where a i l i denotes that agent i chooses the l i -th action in the first optimal joint action, a i m i denotes that agent i chooses the m i -th action in the second optimal joint action, and p(a) denotes the probability of choosing action a.
According to (2) , for action k(k = l i , m i ) of agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we obtain the following:
Since all the Q-values and probabilities are non-negative, the Q-values of action k(k = l i , m i ) of agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} will finally decrease to zero according to (5) . According to (2), for action l i of agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we obtain the following:
According to (5) , when the Q-values of action k(k = l i , m i ) of agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} decrease to zero, the following can be obtained from (6) :
For action m i of agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we obtain the following in the same manner:
It is obvious that
. . , n} decrease to zero. At this time we can determine how the strategy of agent i changes with time using the total derivative formula, (7), (8), and (9), which is depicted as follows:
The model of PMR-IGA consists of n differential equations depicted by (10) . The Jacobin matrix of the model is given as follows:
where
The optimal joint action (a 1
, . . . , a n l n ) corresponds to the pure joint strategy p(a i l i ) = 1 for all agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and the optimal joint action (a 1
, . . . , a n m n ) corresponds to the pure joint strategy p(a i m i ) = 1 for all agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The eigenvalues of (11) at both the critical points are −1. Thus, they are stable.
To show property 1 more vividly, we study the dynamics of PMR-IGA using two cases [25] .
Case 1: A two-agent two-action repeated game. The payoff matrix is shown in Fig. 2 . The maximal total rewards are displayed in parentheses. We assume that a matrix B exists and that each element of B-b ij is strictly smaller than a scalar a(b ij , a ∈ R). Agent 1 is the row agent, and agent 2 is the column agent. Let x and y represent the probability of choosing action 1 of agent 1 and agent 2, respectively. In case 1, the objective function is given as follows:
According to (2) , the following system is obtained:
We can determine how the strategy of agent 1 changes with time using the total derivative formula, which is depicted as follows:ẋ
Using (3), (12) , (13), (14) , and (17), we obtain the following:
Similarly, we can determine how the strategy of agent 2 changes with time as follows:
The critical points in the system depicted by (18) and (19) must satisfy the following:
When (x * , y * ) = (0, 0), the eigenvalues of (22) are λ 1 = λ 2 = −1 < 0. According to the theorem of almost linear systems, this critical point is a stable node. The stability of the other critical points can be determined in the same manner. As a result, the stable critical points include (x * , y * ) = (0, 0), and (1,1). The other critical points are unstable, which means that PMR-IGA can converge to one of the optimal joint strategies. Case 2: A two-agent three-action repeated game. The payoff matrix is shown in Fig. 2 . Let x 1 and x 2 represent the probability of selecting action 1 and action 2 for agent 1, respectively, and let y 1 and y 2 represent the probability of selecting action 1 and action 2 for agent 2, respectively. In case 2, the objective function is given as follows:
According to (1), the following system is obtained:
Using the total derivative formula, we obtain the following:
Three single critical points (
IV. PMR-EGA: A PRACTICAL ALGORITHM
PMR-IGA uses gradient information to update the strategies. To evaluate the gradient, PMR-IGA requires each agent to know the other agents' strategies and the payoff matrix. Each agent can estimate the other agents' strategies by the counting method (which needs observing the other agents' actions). However, the counting method could be slow. Another issue lies in that the payoff matrix cannot be used as a priori knowledge in a learning problem. To solve these problems, a practical algorithm known as PMR-EGA is proposed. In PMR-EGA, it is assumed that each agent can share its strategy with the other agents by communicating with them. This method could be more efficient than the counting method. To solve the second problem, a Q-value function of joint actions is maintained and updated during learning as the estimation of the payoff matrix. Some points about PRM-EGA should be noted. First, it is not necessary to sabotage the game theory setting by sharing strategies. The counting method can meet the game theory setting, though the efficiency of the algorithm might be affected. Second, in addition to sharing strategies, a Q-value function of joint actions is used in our algorithm to estimate the gradient information. It is no doubt that traditional single agent RL algorithms can also be applied within this setting. However, as will be shown in Section VII, the overhead of PMR-EGA is worth it for its superior performance. In fact, some MARL algorithms also use a Q-value function of joint actions to reach the desired performance, e.g. Nash Q-learning [5] , correlated Q-learning [26] , and friendor-foe [27] . Third, in PMR-EGA, each agent selects an action that only depends on its own Q-value function of its own actions and the common Q-value function of joint actions is only used to evaluate the gradient. Four, the Q-value updating 
End if 18: End for each action 19: End for each agent 20: Untilthe predefined total number of playing times is reached.
process described in (1) is transformed into a discrete updating process in PMR-EGA. The pseudo-code of PMR-EGA for repeated games is shown in Algorithm 1, where Q(a) denotes the Q-value of the joint action a. The immediate reward r is the total immediate reward of all agents after joint action a has been taken, and α ∈ (0, 1) is the learning rate for the Q-value function of joint actions. The Q-value of joint actions updates in the ascending direction. The merit of this updating method cannot be observed in repeated games but can be shown in stochastic games because in a stochastic game, we want to know the possible maximal cumulative reward under a state, and the updating of the Q-value in the descending direction produces a negative effect on our goal. Additionally, α i is the learning rate for agent i to update the Q-value function of its own actions. α i can be greater than 1 because the amplitude of the gradient term is quite small at times.
The steps for estimating the gradient are depicted in Algorithm 2. To estimate the gradient accurately, gradient estimation is performed every N playing times, where D i j is For each agent i 6:
For each action j of agent i 7:
If j = a max (i) 8 :
9: Else 10:
11:
End if 12:
End for each action 13:
End for each agent 14: End if 15: End for each joint action the estimated gradient ∂P/∂Q i j , r max is the maximal value in the Q-value function of joint actions, a max is the joint action that corresponds to r max , and a max (i) is the i-th component of a max , which represents the action of agent i. More than one maximal value might occur in the Q-value function of joint actions. Thus, traversal of the Q-value function of joint actions is needed. Suppose that n maximal values occur in the Q-value function of joint actions. The probability of obtaining the maximal value is written as follows:
where P q represents the probability of obtaining the q-th maximal value. If the joint action a max corresponds to the q-th maximal value, we can obtain the following:
where M is the number of agents in the system. ubsequently, we can obtain the partial derivative of P q with respect to Q i a max (i) as follows:
This is the added term in line 8 in Algorithm 2. For the other actions j of agent i (j = a max (i)), the partial derivative of P q with respect to Q i j is written as follows:
This is the added term in line 10 in Algorithm 2. Case 1 can be taken as an example to verify Algorithm 2.
Once learning is completed, the Q-value function of joint actions can be discarded, and only the Q-value function of each agent's own actions is reserved for action selection. In addition, each agent does not need to share the Q-value function of its own actions with the other agents. Each agent selects the action with the maximal Q-value under the current state.
V. SIMULATIONS IN REPEATED GAMES
To verify PMR-EGA, the learning plot of case 1 is presented as shown in Fig. 3 . The parameters are α = 0.9 and α i = 0.1, and the sample time is N = 200. The total number of playing times is 60,000. In the learning plot, twelve points marked with solid circles are used as the initial joint strategies. The joint strategy converges to (x * , y * ) = (0, 0) or (1,1), which are stable critical points of the system described by (18) and (19) . This result means that PMR-EGA converges to the optimal joint strategy.
The learning plot of PMR-EGA in case 2 is shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 . The parameters are the same as those in case 1. Nine points marked with solid circles are used as initial joint strategies. The joint strategy converges to (x * 1 , x * 2 , y * 1 , y * 2 ) = (1, 0, 1, 0)or(0, 1, 0, 1), which are stable critical points of the system described by (30)- (33) . Thus, the maximal total reward is finally achieved in case 2.
The real gradient and the estimated gradient in case 1 are compared. Only the gradient for agent 1 is given. In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , the solid line represents the real gradient, the dashed line represents the estimated gradient, and the horizontal axis represents the number of playing times. The repeated game of case 1 was played 60,000 times, and we give the result for only the first 2,000 playing times. The gradient is updated every 200 playing times. The estimated gradient catches up with the real gradient within 2,000 playing times. This outcome verifies the effectiveness of the gradient estimation method. VOLUME 6, 2018 
VI. PMR-EGA FOR STOCHASTIC GAMES
PMR-EGA for repeated games (algorithm 1) can be naturally extended to an algorithm for optimizing stochastic games. The pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 3. In a stochastic game, we must identify the payoff matrices under each state to evaluate the gradient under each state. The elements of the payoff matrices are cumulative rewards. Thus, the payoff matrices under each state can be estimated using the following Q-value updating rule during learning:
where s is the current state, a is the joint action selected under state s, s' is the state transited from s, and a' is the joint action selected under state s'. The updating of the Q-value function of joint actions is performed only in the ascending direction for the reason explained in algorithm 1. The gradient under state s is estimated once it is visited N times. When the gradient is ready for evaluation, only the Q-values for state s must be input to Algorithm 2. The gradient is used to update each agent's Q-value function of its own actions. Optimization of a stochastic game usually requires more learning time than a repeated game. To prevent the Q-value function of each agent's own actions from converging too early, a scale coefficient c ∈ (0, 1) is used to confine the updating amplitude of Q-value, as shown by the following equation
where D i j (s) is the estimated gradient for action j of agent i, and (39) and (40) indicate that the absolute value of the changes of Q-value cannot exceed c% of its original value during every update.
VII. SIMULATIONS IN STOCHASTIC GAMES A. CASE A: BOX PUSHING
Box pushing [28] , [29] is a cooperative task in which agents need to push boxes to the desired positions as soon Under the current state s, select an action j according to the following probability distribution 6:
Observe the next state s', the immediate total reward r, and the joint action a.
10:
For each agent i 11:
Under the state s', select an action j according to the following probability distribution 12:
End for each agent 14:
Observe the joint action a'.
15:
If
End if 18:
Update r max (s) -the maximal Q(s,a) under state s for alla.
19:
If the state s has been visited N times 20:
Use Algorithm 2 to estimate the gradient D i j (s) under the state s for each action j of each agent i.
21:
For each agent i 22:
For each action j of agent i 23:
Update Q i j according to Eq. (39) and Eq. (40) 24 :
End if 27:
End for each action 28:
End for each agent 29:
End if 30:
a ← a 32: Until the episode is over. 33: Until the predefined number of episodes have been completed.
as possible. As illustrated in Fig. 8 , four boxes are located in the vertices of a polygon. Four agents are responsible for pushing the boxes to make them uniformly distributed. The agents are not shown in Fig. 8 , and they do not occupy any vertices. This problem contains a total of 11808 states (not including the absorbing states). Each agent has three actions: pushing a box to the adjacent clockwise vertex, pushing a box to the adjacent anticlockwise vertex, or doing nothing. The rules of box movement are not depicted in the details of [29] . Thus, the following five movement rules are applied in this paper. Rule 1. All boxes move at the same time. Rule 2. If two adjacent boxes move to each other or two boxes move to the same unoccupied vertex, both of them fail to move and stay where they were.
Rule 3. A box that moves to an occupied vertex fails to move and remains still.
Rule 4. If no condition in rule 2 and rule 3 is met, the box can move successfully.
Rule 5. When a string of adjacent boxes move to the same direction, if the 'head' box moves successfully, the entire group of boxes moves successfully.
The credit assignment rules state that if all boxes have been pushed to the desired state, then each agent is rewarded with a score of 10; otherwise, each agent receives a score of -1.
The comparison algorithms include WoLF-PHC [18] , the exponential moving average (EMA) Q-learning algorithm [30] , and single-agent RL. The ε-greedy policy is applied for action exploration in all comparison algorithms. SARSA [13] is chosen as the single-agent RL algorithm. The parameters were tested in many trials. For PMR-EGA, the constant parameters include the learning rate α = 0.9 for the Q-value function of joint actions, the learning rate α i = 50 for each agent i(i = 1, 2, 3, 4), the discount factor γ = 1.0, and the sample time N = 200. The Q-value function of joint actions is initialized as 0. The Q-value function of each agent's own action is initialized as 8.0. The scale coefficient c is as follows:
where L is the predefined number of learning episodes, n is the number of experienced learning episodes, and c is set to a small value in the initial learning stage because the payoff matrices have not been estimated accurately at this time. As the learning proceeds, the value of c grows in a step-wise manner. The ε-greedy policy is not used in PMR-EGA in the box-pushing problem. For EMA Q-learning, the constant parameters are ε = 0.2, k = 2, and γ = 0.9. The learning rate α follows (42), with α ini = 0.7; and η l = 0.001η w and η w follows (43).
For WoLF-PHC, the constant parameters include δ w = 0.003, δ l = 0.01, γ = 0.9, and ε = 0.8. The learning rate α follows (42), with α ini = 0.7. For single-agent RL, α, γ , and ε are the same as those in WoLF-PHC. The performance metrics include the average steps per episode and the average success rate. If the agents use the minimum steps to complete an episode, then we call it a success. To evaluate the success rate over a large number of episodes, we develop an algorithm that can determine the exact minimum number of steps in an episode for any initial box positions. The results in Table 1 and Table 2 are averaged TABLE 3 . Maximal steps for 4-agent/12-vertex box pushing (evaluation episodes = 50,000).
over 100 runs. Each run consists of L learning episodes and 50,000 evaluation episodes in which the strategies of all agents are fixed. The experiments are independent for each value of L. In the beginning of an episode, the boxes are randomly distributed in the vertices of the polygon. An episode is ended when all boxes are uniformly distributed or 100 steps have occurred. For the sake of fairness, in the same columns of Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 , the initial positions of the boxes for the evaluation episodes are the same.
All algorithms perform better as the value of L grows. PMR-EGA presents the best performance for all different values of L. When L is 1,200,000, the increase in performance is not obvious for EMA Q-learning. If additional learning episodes are given, PMR-EGA, single-agent RL, and WoLF-PHC might continue to optimize the strategy. Moreover, PMR-EGA can obtain an average success rate of 99.5% when L is 1,200,000, which means that PMR-EGA can use the minimum steps to complete the box-pushing task with a probability of 99.5%. This result is sufficiently good to complete the task satisfactorily. Single-agent RL performs fairly well when L is 1,200,000, but it is still outperformed by PMR-EGA. The results of the worst run are presented in Table 3 . PMR-EGA uses less number of steps than the other algorithms in the worst run. Considering that it also obtains the smallest variance, PMR-EGA is more reliable than the other algorithms. 
B. CASE B: DISTRIBUTED SENSOR NETWORK
The second test bed is the DSN problem [31] , [32] . As shown in Fig. 9 , eight sensors surround three cells where two targets dwell. The sensors must coordinate with each other to capture both targets. In the beginning of an episode, the energy of each target is 3. At each time step, each target moves to its left cell, moves to its right cell, or stays still. Each cell can be occupied by one target at most. If there are two targets in the cells, the left target moves first. If a target is already in the marginal cell, i.e., in cell 0 or in cell 2, and it attempts to move to the outside of cell region, then it will fail to move and remain still. The positions and energies of the two targets constitute the state space. At each time step, each sensor selects one of three actions: focus on its left cell, focus on its right cell, or do nothing at all. If at least three sensors focus on one target, then the energy of the target is reduced by one, which is known as a hit. When the energy of a target is 0, the target is captured and removed from the cell, and the sensors participating in the last hit are each rewarded with 10. If four sensors capture a target, only the sensors with the largest three indices are rewarded. Each focus is rewarded with -1, and no focus is rewarded with 0. In an episode, the eight sensors take action simultaneously according to the current state, the reward is assigned to each sensor, and the targets take action in a sequence from left to right. An episode ends if both targets are captured or the number of time steps exceeds 1000.
The same algorithms as in case A are applied for comparison. The ε-greedy policy is used in all algorithms, including PMR-EGA. For PMR-EGA, the constant parameters include α = 0.9, α i = 15, γ = 0.9, and ε = 0.1, and the sample time is N = 1200. The value of N in this case is larger than that in the last case, because the DSN problem has much less states and much more joint actions. The Q-value function of joint actions is initialized as 0. The Q-value function of each agent's own action is initialized as 8.0. The scale coefficient c follows (41). For EMA Q-learning, the learning rate α follows (42), with α ini = 0.7, and ε = 0.8, k = 2, γ = 0.9, η l = 0.001η w , and η w follows (43). For WoLF-PHC, the constant parameters include δ w = 0.003, δ l = 0.01, γ = 0.9, and ε = 0.2. The learning rate α follows (42), with α ini = 0.7. For single-agent RL, α, γ , and ε are the same as those used in WoLF-PHC.
The performance metrics in the DSN problem include the average cumulative reward, the average steps, and the average success rate. The optimal strategy states that each of the three sensors focuses on a target while the remaining sensors do nothing at all. Thus, the optimal cumulative reward is 42, and the minimum number of steps is 3. Moreover, the action of no focus is rewarded with 0, which means that the optimal cumulative reward can be achieved with more than three steps. Therefore, we choose the average steps as the The results are averaged over 100 runs. Table 4 , Table 5  and Table 6 show the average success rate, the average cumulative reward, and the average number of steps, respectively. These results show single-agent RL performs quite poorly. The reason for this result might be that the number of agents is eight and the number of joint actions under each state is 3 8 = 6561, which is 81 times higher than that of the box pushing problem, whereas the ε-greedy policy is not sufficient to explore such a large action space. The EMA Q-learning algorithm gains an average success rate of merely 7.4% when L is 400,000, and increases in performance are not observed. When L is 200,000, although WoLF-PHC can reach an average reward of 40.9, no significant improvement occurs when L is larger than 200,000. Compared with the other algorithms, PRM-EGA shows considerable advantages over the other algorithms when L is 400, 000 and can gain the theoretical optimal cumulative reward of 42 in an episode with a probability of 99.6%. The simulation experiments verify that the proposed PMR-EGA algorithm is effective and presents a highly consistent performance for both stochastic games. To compare the reliability, we present the results of the worst run in Table 7 and Table 8 . PMR-EGA can gain the most cumulative reward with the smallest number of steps in the worst case.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a gradient-ascent-based MARL algorithm, PMR-IGA, is presented. The optimality and convergence of PMR-IGA can be analyzed using stability theory. The analysis shows that the maximal reward can always be achieved for any initial condition in repeated games with finite players, finite actions and two maximal total rewards. A practical MARL algorithm PMR-EGA is proposed together with a gradient estimation method. The Q-value function of joint actions is used to approximate the payoff matrices and estimate the gradient. Simulations in repeated games show that the gradient estimation method is effective and the learning process of PMR-EGA is consistent with the dynamics of PMR-IGA. Because of the gradient estimation method, PMR-EGA can be naturally extended to optimize stochastic games. This extension allows PMR-EGA to address more practical problems. PMR-EGA displays highly consistent and excellent performance in the two stochastic games of box pushing and DSNs. We are currently designing a gradient estimation method which does not require agents to share their strategies, and does not need the Q table of joint actions. In future work, we will try to extend our algorithm to tasks with partial observability of states [33] . We will also attempt to combine function approximation techniques [34] - [36] with our method to address problems with continuous actions. 
